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A growing body of evidence suggests that conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs can have strong, 
positive effects on a range of welfare indicators for poor households in developing countries. However, 
the contribution of individual program components toward achieving these outcomes is not well 
understood. This paper contributes to filling this gap by explicitly testing the importance of conditionality 
on one specific outcome related to human capital formation (namely school enrollment), using data 
collected during the evaluation of Mexico’s Programa de Educación, Salud, y Alimentación 
(PROGRESA) CCT program. We exploit the fact that some PROGRESA beneficiaries who received 
transfers did not receive the forms needed to monitor their children’s attendance at school. We use a 
variety of techniques, including nearest neighbor matching and household fixed effects regressions, to 
show that the lack of these forms reduced the likelihood of children attending school, with this effect 
being most pronounced among children who were transitioning to lower secondary school. We provide 
substantial evidence that these findings are not driven by unobservable characteristics related to 
households or localities. 





1.  BACKGROUND 
Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are becoming an increasingly popular tool for poverty alleviation. 
Drawing on lessons learned from programs in a variety of countries—most notably Mexico’s PROGRESA 
program
1—CCTs are now found throughout the developing world. As implied by their name, conditional 
cash transfer programs give cash transfers to households that meet specific conditions or undertake certain 
actions, such as ensuring that school-age children go to school or that preschool children regularly see a 
nurse or doctor. Many of these programs have been carefully evaluated in order to demonstrate their 
effectiveness.
2 However, such evaluations normally treat the CCT as a “black box,” assessing the 
combined effect of all of the components of the CCT on a given outcome, without considering which 
aspects of CCTs make them successful at improving target outcomes.
3 As a result, little is known 
regarding the importance of the individual CCT components. For example, there is a lively debate 
regarding the desirability of imposing conditions on beneficiaries (Szekely 2006; Samson 2006; 
Freelander 2007), but there is little evidence to bring to this debate.  
Both public and private perspectives provide good rationales to impose conditions on the receipt 
of cash transfers. From a public perspective, there are three related rationales. First, governments may 
perceive that they know which actions or behaviors will benefit the poor better than do the poor 
themselves; consequently, conditioning transfers can induce changes in recipients’ behavior that led to 
outcomes that governments regard as desirable. For example, governments may place greater weight on 
the intrinsic value of educating girls than their families do. Second, conditioning may help the 
government overcome information asymmetries. Governments may be aware of the benefits associated 
with immunization or screening for chronic diseases but individuals may be unaware or unconvinced of 
these benefits. When other approaches to such informational problems—such as public health 
campaigns—have failed, conditioning transfers can be seen as a means of changing behaviors. Finally, 
conditioning may be required for political economy reasons. Politicians and policymakers are often 
evaluated by performance indicators such as changes in school enrollment or health clinic use. By 
conditioning transfers on behaviors that increase these indicators, politicians and policymakers can 
provide useful evidence of accomplishments long before the indicators show more important evidence of 
poverty reduction (for example, increased productivity or better adult health). Therefore, politicians can 
perceive that conditioning of transfers is a useful tool to help them stay in office.  
From the private perspective, the conditional component of CCTs can also have potential 
benefits. First, disagreements may exist within households regarding the allocation of resources. Imposing 
conditionality on cash transfers can strengthen the bargaining position of individuals whose preferences 
are aligned with the government’s preferences, but who may otherwise lack bargaining power within the 
household. Second, conditioning may overcome stigma effects otherwise associated with welfare 
payments. The stigma attached to welfare payments may discourage those with valid claims from taking 
benefits. From the beneficiary’s point of view, conditioning can be seen as part of a social contract with 
the state, thereby legitimizing the transfer and overcoming the stigma. Finally, recent work in behavioral 
economics emphasizes that when households have hyperbolic discount functions, they undertake actions 
that can reduce their own welfare (Laibson 1997). In such circumstances, households are better off under 
constraints designed to reduce or limit their ability to trade future consumption for present consumption. 
Conditionality can be seen as such a constraint. 
                                                      
1 Programa de Educación, Salud, y Alimentación. The program was renamed Oportunidades and expanded to urban areas 
when Vincente Fox became president of Mexico in 2000. 
2 For example, see the work on PROGRESA summarized in Skoufias (2005) and Levy (2006), and on Nicaragua’s Red de 
Proteccion Social (RPS) found in Maluccio and Flores (2005). Studies focusing on the impact of PROGRESA on schooling-
related outcomes include those of Schultz (2004), Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd (2005), and de Janvry and Sadoulet (2006). 
3 A general discussion of the merits and limitations of experimental approaches to the evaluation of social programs is found 




Although the rationales for conditionality may seem compelling, there are a number of concerns 
regarding the imposition of conditionality. First, conditionality increases the administrative costs and 
complexity of running a cash transfer program. Caldés, Coady, and Maluccio (2006) show that 
monitoring conditionality represents approximately 18 percent of PROGRESA’s administrative costs and 
2 percent of total program costs. If the actual or perceived benefits of conditionality do not outweigh the 
additional costs, it may not be worthwhile to condition the transfers. Second, when the act of meeting 
conditions imposes direct costs on beneficiaries, conditionality reduces the benefits accruing to the 
participants. Molyneux (2007) notes that such costs are not necessarily shared equally among household 
members, as mothers often accompany children to health clinics or attend community meetings. Third, if 
the preferences of the poor do not align with the conditions placed on their behavior by the government, 
the restrictions that conditionality imposes on the poor will reduce their total welfare gains, thus 
decreasing the net benefits of the CCT. Fourth, some households may find the conditions too difficult to 
meet; if these are among the poorest households in the program, imposing conditions may detract from 
the targeting of the CCT. Fifth, conditionality can create an opportunity for corruption, whereby 
individuals who are responsible for certifying that conditions have been met could demand payments for 
doing so. Sixth, conditioning transfers can be perceived as being demeaning to the poor. Conditioning can 
be seen as implying that the poor simply do not know what is good for them. Finally, Freelander (2007) 
describes the imposition of conditionality as “morally atrocious,” arguing that because social protection 
falls under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is indefensible to attach conditions to their 
receipt.  
Since conditionality is always part of the CCT package, it is not clear whether the benefits of 
conditionality actually outweigh the costs outlined above. The objective of this paper is to begin to 
provide evidence on the impact of conditioning transfers in the context of a conditional cash transfer 
program. We exploit the fact that some beneficiaries of Mexico’s PROGRESA program did not receive 
the forms needed to monitor the attendance of their children at school. Using administrative data on 
transfers in combination with data collected as part of PROGRESA evaluation, we assess the impact of 
imposing education-related conditions on school enrollment and attendance empirically. Regardless of the 
technique we use, we find that on average, the absence of the forms reduces the likelihood of school 
attendance. The effect of conditionality depends upon the grade level of the student, and the absence of 
conditionality has the strongest impact on the enrollment of children making the transition to lower 
secondary school, whereas it has no measurable impact on children continuing in primary school. As the 
nonreceipt of forms is not random, several robustness checks are completed to ensure that our results are 
not due to unobserved heterogeneity at either the household or community level. Finally, we provide 
evidence suggesting that the effect is more pronounced among households with illiterate heads and among 
households in which the head does not perform agricultural labor, indicating that the results may be 
partially due to informational problems and the opportunity cost of schooling for such children.
4 
 
                                                      
4 Only one other study has attempted to estimate the impacts of conditionality on conditioning cash transfers using a similar 
strategy (Schady and Aruajo 2006). That study used the fact that many people in Ecuador believed that transfers in Bono de 




2.  PROGRAM DESCRIPTION AND DATA 
PROGRESA was introduced by the Federal Government of Mexico as part of an effort to break the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty. The program was primarily aimed at improving the 
educational, health, and nutritional status of poor families, particularly children and their mothers. The 
program was initially implemented in poor rural communities with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants. 
Households were selected for inclusion on the basis of both locality and household characteristics. 
Implementation began in August 1997 with the incorporation of approximately 140,000 households into 
the program. By early 2000, PROGRESA included nearly 2.6 million families in 72,345 localities in all 31 
Mexican states, constituting around 40 percent of all rural families and one-ninth of all families in 
Mexico. Beneficiaries received cash transfers on a bimonthly basis. The transfers had three components: a 
scholarship tied to the continued attendance of children at school (the beca), money for school supplies, 
and a cash transfer for food (the alimento). PROGRESA (1997) provides a more detailed description of 
the program.  
To receive the beca, school-aged children in grades 3 and higher had to maintain an attendance 
record of 85 percent or better, and parents had to attend monthly meetings called platicas. To ensure 
compliance with this condition, parents were supposed to initially receive an “E1” form when they were 
inducted into PROGRESA. Parents were to take this form to the teacher, who would sign the form and 
register the child for attendance monitoring, and then parents were to return the E1 form to PROGRESA 
officials. Usually, the form was actually returned to the local promotora (a woman in the community who 
acted as a liaison between beneficiaries and PROGRESA). PROGRESA officials then were supposed to 
match E1 forms with school attendance records that the teachers kept separately for PROGRESA 
enrollees. After confirming that attendance was satisfactory, officials arranged for the payment of the 
beca. The payment of the beca occurred every two months; promotoras spread the word in the 
community that payments would be made on a certain date at a specific place, and PROGRESA officials 
would then set up portable tables and hand the beneficiaries envelopes containing their payments.  
Our study hinges on the fact that a significant proportion of PROGRESA households never 
received the E1 form, yet still received transfers. These payments could not have been conditioned, since 
teachers would not have had reason to monitor the attendance of children in these families.
5 We argue that 
the failure to receive an E1 form cannot be related to any household- or community-level unobservables, 
and as a result we can use an indicator variable for the receipt of an E1 form to measure the effect of 
conditionality on school enrollment in the PROGRESA program. 
We use two data sources for our study. First, we use administrative data on beca payments made 
between March and August of 1999 to measure which households received transfers.
6 We then use 
household identifiers to match the households receiving transfers with those interviewed during the 
evaluation surveys completed as part of PROGRESA. The bulk of the data used herein are from the 
evaluation survey conducted in May and June of 1999, as this survey (the seguimento) asked beneficiaries 
about their experiences with PROGRESA.
7 The seguimento specifically asked whether households had 
received the E1 form, as well as a series of questions about the conditions the households were supposed 
to meet in order to receive transfers.
8 For the purposes of our analysis, we only use households that 
actually received transfers that were supposed to be tied to school attendance (the beca). 
                                                      
5 We confirmed this point in discussions with both Santiago Levy, the architect of PROGRESA, and Emmanuel Skoufias, 
who was responsible for leading the evaluation of PROGRESA. Both indicated that if the household did not receive an E1 form, 
no monitoring of attendance was possible.  
6 Note that subsequent payments to households included in our data set likely became conditioned soon thereafter as 
administration of PROGRESA improved; we do not observe whether they received an E1 form after receiving payments in the 
period we study around the evaluation survey.  
7 The sampling frame only includes households with at least one child age 6 to 17.  
8 We also use several variables from the October 1998 evaluation survey round, such as per capita expenditures and 




We find that 4,383 households received at least one beca transfer for children’s school attendance 
between March and August of 1999, and among them, 464 did not receive the E1 form. Children in these 
households, designated Group 1, could not have had their attendance monitored by PROGRESA. The 
remaining 3,919 households, which received the E1 form and received at least one beca payment for 
children’s school attendance between March and August 1999, are designated Group 2. Households in 
Groups 1 and 2 share important similarities: they are all beneficiaries of the PROGRESA program, they 
all have school-age children, and they all received beca payments from PROGRESA for school attendance 
by their children. The difference is that the behavior of households in Group 1 could not be monitored, 
and by extension, these transfers could not be conditioned on attendance. As such, comparing outcomes 
among children of households in Groups 1 and 2 constitutes a potential way to assess the impact of 
conditionality on school attendance. 
Although the comparison of Groups 1 and 2 may suggest that conditionality affects schooling-
related outcomes, it is possible that household members who understood the conditions might assume that 
the program was somehow monitoring them, rendering the E1 unnecessary and meaning that comparison 
of Groups 1 and 2 would not be a true test of conditionality. To address this concern, we use the May-
June 1999 survey to develop a second test of conditionality. The survey asked beneficiary households to 
list the conditions that they were required to fulfill in order to receive the beca payment. Using this 
information, we take the same sample of households and create two further groups for comparison. 
Households in Group 3 neither received form E1, nor did they know that they were required to send their 
children to school in order to receive the beca payment. Households in Group 4 received the E1 and did 
know that they were required to send their children to school in order to receive school benefits.
9 Since 
households in Group 3 neither received the form necessary for the transfer to be conditional nor knew the 
conditions for the transfer, the transfers they received were clearly unconditional. 
Even if we can demonstrate a difference in average school enrollment or attendance between 
Groups 1 and 2 and/or Groups 3 and 4, the difference should not be immediately attributed to 
conditionality. There are several plausible reasons that some households received the E1 form while 
others did not. Some of these reasons might be related to observable or unobservable household 
characteristics, whereas others would suggest that the lack of an E1 form is quasi-experimental. For 
example, specific communities might simply have not received E1 forms, which would imply that 
endogenous program placement might have occurred. Alternatively, a given household might have missed 
the platica at which the E1 form was distributed, due to potentially observable (for example, 
environmental shock) or unobservable reasons. It could also be that at some platicas, the promotoras 
simply ran out of forms. In this latter case, the households that did not receive forms would essentially be 
selected randomly. 
To ensure that our results are due to the lack of conditionality rather than differences in either 
observables or unobservables, we proceed as follows. We condition the unconditional means between 
groups with differences in observable characteristics, using both probit and nearest neighbor matching 
methods. To ensure that the differences we find are not due to a lack of forms or other unobservables, in a 
few specific communities or a few communities within one particular state we examine the rate of E1 
form receipt at both the state and municipio level.
10 We then provide several robustness checks to ensure 
that our results are not due to household-level unobservables; in one such test, we control for household-
level fixed effects, which should control for any time-invariant unobservable differences at the household 
level. 
                                                      
9 To provide a clean basis for comparison between Groups 3 and 4, we take the full sample of PROGRESA-eligible 
households and drop all households that did not receive the E1 but knew the conditions for receiving the beca, and all households 
that received the E1 but did not know the conditions. 




3.  RESULTS 
Basic Findings 
We begin by examining unconditional mean school enrollment by the groups defined above. Among 
children 8-16 years of age who have completed grades 3-8, 83.2 percent of children in Group 1 
households are enrolled in school, while 88.6 percent of children in Group 2 households are enrolled 
(Table 1).
11 Even after taking into account the clustered nature of the survey, this difference is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level.
12 The difference is even larger when we also consider whether or not the 
households understood the conditions. The enrollment rate among children in households in Group 3 is 
80.1 percent, whereas it is 89.2 percent for children in Group 4 households. The differences in mean 
enrollments are therefore suggestive that conditionality does affect enrollment, but the differences could 
still be explained by a myriad of other factors. 
Table 1. Enrollment rates of children aged 8-16 who have completed grades 3-8, by household 






Wald test on 
differences in 
enrollment rate 
   (percent)   
1 (Household did not receive an E1 form)  547  83.2  8.63** 
2 (Household received an E1 form)  5,090  88.6   
3 (Household did not receive an E1 form and could not 
describe conditions) 
261 80.1  13.44** 
4 (Household received an E1 form and could describe 
conditions) 
2,870 89.2   
Notes: All children reside in households receiving PROGRESA payments for school attendance. The Wald test for equivalence of 
enrollment rates controls for intracluster correlation within localities. ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
The unconditional means mask striking differences by grade level. We next calculate the share of 
children in PROGRESA households found in Groups 1 and 3 by completed grade level (Table 2). We find 
that the incidence of Group 1 and Group 3 membership is approximately the same for all grade levels. 
Next, we calculate the mean enrollment rate by grade level and group (Table 3), and plot the differences 
between means for Groups 1 and 2 (Figure 1) and Groups 3 and 4 (Figure 2). We find the largest 
between-group difference in school enrollment among children who have completed grade 6, that is, those 
who have finished primary school and should be entering lower secondary school. Children in households 
that did not receive the E1 form are much less likely—by 17 to 20 percent—to enroll in lower secondary 
school, whether or not their parents are aware of the attendance conditionality. These differences are 
significant at the 1 percent level (Table 3). For other grade levels, the differences are not nearly as large, 
not always statistically significant, and in some cases children in Groups 1 and 3 are slightly more likely 
to enroll than children in Groups 2 and 4. Therefore, the data suggest that the conditionality of transfers 
could be quite important when students move from primary school to lower secondary school in this 
specific case, or in general when students enter a higher level of schooling. However, our caveats 
regarding both observable and unobservable differences between households remain.
13 
                                                      
11 We use age 8 as the lower age cutoff as this is the lowest age where we observe children in grade 3, the first grade for 
which PROGRESA conditionality applies. Localities where all beneficiaries received the E1 form are dropped from the sample. 
12 Only one round of the survey provides information on receipt of the E1 form, knowledge of conditionality, and 
administrative data by type of transfer received. Therefore it is inappropriate to perform the difference-in-difference estimation, 
as used in many other papers on PROGRESA (for example, Schultz 2004 and Todd and Wolpin 2006). Nonetheless, when we 
examine average differences in school attendance between Groups 1 and 2 and 3 and 4 in earlier surveys, we find no significant 
difference. 




Table 2. Share of children in PROGRESA households that did not receive the E1 form, by grade 
level and understanding of conditions 
Last grade level 
completed 
Share in Group 1 
(household did not receive the E1 
form) 
Share in Group 3 (household did not 







 3  0.103  1,278  0.085  691 
 4  0.091  1,097  0.081  621 
 5  0.087  1,022  0.070  575 
 6  0.107  1,342  0.103  728 
 7  0.102  489  0.078  271 
 8  0.081  409  0.065  245 
Notes: All children reside in households receiving PROGRESA payments for school attendance. 
 
Table 3. School enrollment rates among PROGRESA households, by completed grade and group 
Last grade level completed 
Share enrolled in school  Share enrolled in school 
Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4 
3 0.977  0.958  0.966  0.956 
4 0.930  0.956  0.900  0.956 
5 0.978  0.942  0.950  0.942 
6 0.521  0.691**  0.520  0.715** 
7 0.860  0.920  0.714  0.916** 
8 0.879  0.915  0.937  0.913 
Notes: Group 1 households did not receive the E1 form. They are compared with Group 2 households, which did receive the E1 
form. Group 3 households did not receive the E1 form and could not describe the PROGRESA conditions, whereas Group 4 
households both received the E1 form and could describe the conditions. ** indicates that the difference between the share 
enrolled is significant at the 5 percent level, taking into account the clustering of the data. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
not the result of unobservables. If unobservables explain the difference in enrollment between Groups 1 and 2 and/or Groups 3 




Figure 1. Difference in school enrollment between those who received the E1 form to enforce 




































































Years of Completed Schooling
 
Figure 2. Difference in school enrollment between those who received the E1 form and could name 








































































































To control for observable differences between children, households, and localities, we estimate 
probits where the dependent variable equals one if the child is enrolled and zero otherwise (Table 4). Our 
primary explanatory variable of interest is an indicator variable denoting households that did not receive 
the E1 form in the first specification (Panel A), and households who neither received the form nor knew 
the conditions (Panel B). In successive specifications, we build up the set of observable variables we use 
as controls. We initially control for state of residence, then include child characteristics (age dummies, 
gender), characteristics of the household head and spouse (age, gender, occupation, indigenous status, and 
literacy of the head; and indigenous status and literacy of the head’s spouse), basic household 
characteristics (the logarithm of household size and consumption per capita, both measured in the earlier 
October 1998 survey round),
14 indicator variables measuring whether the household received the 
PROGRESA manual, whether or not the household had a health register, whether the household contained 
someone who served as a promotora for PROGRESA; and the number of platica meetings 
attended/missed by household members, household-level shocks (indicator variables for drought, flood, 
fire, frozen crops, crop disease, and earthquake tremors), and finally, several community-level 
characteristics (indicator variables for the presence of electricity, a primary school, a lower secondary 
school, and a secondary school).
15 
The estimated coefficients imply a change in enrollment broadly consistent with the difference in 
unconditional means reported in Table 1. Whereas the difference in unconditional means is 5.4 percent, 
after we control for child characteristics, we find that children in households lacking an E1 form are 4.6 
percent less likely to enroll in school, on average (Table 4, Panel A, column 2). Adding additional 
parental, household, and community controls has little effect on the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient; the coefficient estimated when using the full set of controls implies that the lack of an E1 
form makes children 4.4 percent less likely to enroll in school, on average (Table 4, Panel A, column 6). 
When we add that households did not know the conditions to the definition of the indicator 
variable for conditionality in the probit estimation controlling for the full set of characteristics (Table 4, 
Panel B, column 6), we find that children were 7.0 percent less likely to enroll in school, on average, as 
compared to the unconditional difference of 9.1 percent. While controlling for observable characteristics 
accounts for some of the difference between school enrollment among children in households who 
received the E1 form and those who did not, much of the difference is not accounted for by these control 
variables. Children whose attendance was not being monitored have lower enrollment rates than children 
whose attendance could be monitored, even when we control for observable household characteristics. 
Table 4. Probit estimates of the impact of nonreceipt of the E1 form on school enrollment of 
children who had completed grades 3-8 
Panel A: Comparing Group 1 (did not receive the E1 form) with Group 2 (received the E1 form) 
 Specification 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Household did not receive an E1 form  -0.054  -0.046 -0.045  -0.046 -0.049  -0.044 
 (3.37)** (3.68)** (3.53)** (3.62)**  (3.79)**  (2.56)** 
State  controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Child  controls  No Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Parental controls  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Basic household controls  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Household-level additional and shock controls  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Community  controls  No No No No  No  Yes 
                                                      
14 See Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004) for details on the construction of these variables.  
15 Replacing the state-level indicators and the community-level characteristics with a full set of municipio or locality 




Panel B: Comparing Group 3 (did not receive E1 form and did not know conditions) and Group 4 
(received E1 form and knew conditions) 
 Specification 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Household did not receive an E1 form -0.090 -0.067  -0.064 -0.066 -0.074 -0.070 
 (4.23)** (3.97)** (3.90)** (3.95)**  (4.08)**  (3.95)**
State controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Child controls  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Parental controls  No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Basic household controls  No No No Yes  Yes  Yes 
Household-level additional and shock controls No No No No Yes  Yes 
Community  Controls  No No No No No  Yes 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported, cluster-robust z statistics are in parentheses. See Appendix Tables 1 and 2 for the full results 
of Table 4 Panels A and B, respectively, as well as the full list of variables included in these regressions. The sample sizes are 
5,637 in Panel A and 3,131 in Panel B. ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
However, the results shown in Table 4 do not account for the potential heterogeneity in the 
effects of receiving the E1 form, which are suggested in Figures 1 and 2. Therefore we next replicate the 
probits for different completed grades, controlling for the full set of state, child, parent, household, and 
community characteristics (Table 5). We find that conditionality has the strongest effect among children 
who had completed grade 6, that is, children transitioning from primary to lower secondary school. When 
comparing Groups 1 and 2, we find that children in households that did not receive the E1 form were 
about 21 percent less likely to enroll in lower secondary school, and when comparing Groups 3 and 4, we 
find that children in households that did not receive the E1 form and were unaware of the conditions were 
18 percent less likely to enroll. For children continuing primary school (having completed grades 3, 4, or 
5), there is no evidence that conditionality has a significant effect on school enrollment. 
Table 5. Probit results of the impact of nonreceipt of the E1 form on school enrollment, by 
completed grade 
Completed grade  Household did not receive  
E1 form 
Household did not receive E1 form 
and could not recite conditions 
3 0.002  <0.001 
 (1.01)  (0.042) 
Number of observations  1,243  411 
4 0.003  0.001 
 (0.35)  (0.04) 
Number of observations  969  385 
5 0.013  0.004 
 (1.16)  (0.20) 
Number of observations  927  504 
6 -0.211  -0.183 
 (4.15)**  (2.91)** 
Number of observations  1,308  703 
7 -0.044  -0.255 
 (1.30)  (2.95)** 




Table 5. Continued  
Completed grade  Household did not receive  
E1 form 
Household did not receive E1 form 
and could not recite conditions 
8 0.012  X 
 (0.34)   
Number of observations  393  209 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported; cluster-robust z statistics are in parentheses. Each cell represents a separate regression. All 
regressions include all controls in column 6 of Table 4 Panels A and B. No result is available for members of Group 3 who had 
completed grade 8, because the “successes” were perfectly determined. ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
One could consider the differences in enrollment rates we find between children in Groups 1 and 
2 and Groups 3 and 4 as the difference between the effect of conditioning transfers and the effect of 
increased income on school enrollment for those children completing grade 6. As the point estimate for 
the effect of conditioning is large—17 percentage points—one might be concerned that the income effect 
is negative. While Schultz (2004) finds that PROGRESA causes an 8.3 percentage point increase in 
enrollment among children who have completed grade 6, other estimates of the effect of PROGRESA on 
enrollment suggest larger impacts. Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd (2005) use a Markov transition analysis 
to show that when one considers a larger range of potential educational transitions, the increase in 
enrollment due to conditionality is much higher than Schultz finds with the more limited difference-in-
difference estimator. de Janvry and Sadoulet (2006) also consider the effect of heterogeneity on the 
impact of conditional cash transfers by transfer level among children leaving grade 6, and find that a 
conditional transfer of $200/year is associated with a 14-percentage-point increase in the probability of 
enrollment. Since the average transfer amount is $200/year in their sample, one would expect an even 
larger impact of income on enrollment, ceteris paribus. They also present evidence suggesting that 
unconditional transfers should have a small, positive impact on enrollment through the household 
expenditure variable. Therefore, their estimates imply a small positive income effect. These findings are 
quite consistent with ours, as the magnitude of our coefficient estimate is similar to theirs.
16 
Initial Controls for Unobservables 
Although the unconditional means and the probit results provide prima facie evidence that conditionality 
affects enrollment, they implicitly assume that nonreceipt of the E1 form is uncorrelated with 
unobservable characteristics at the household or locality level. This assumption is quite strong, and it is 
not difficult to think of reasons why it might be violated. For example, suppose that there were 
administrative problems in one location that led to poor distribution of the E1 forms. Suppose, too, that 
this location had poor quality schools, or schools that were difficult to get to. If so, the differences in 
enrollment rates would reflect these factors and not the absence of the E1 forms. 
However, there is evidence in the data that the nonreceipt of the E1 form is not driven by 
unobservable differences in administration by community. First, consider the distribution of households 
not receiving the E1 form by state (Table 6). The share of households that did not receive an E1 form is 
spread out nearly evenly across the seven states. Still, it could be that a few municipios in each state did 
not distribute E1 forms, and hence those states drive the distribution. We therefore illustrate the 
proportion of households not receiving the E1 form by municipio (Figure 3), which shows that that 
nonreceipt of forms is distributed widely across the sample.
17 Therefore, a bias similar to endogenous 
program placement bias does not seem to exist for the nonreceipt of E1 forms. 
                                                      
16 It is further worth mentioning that Bobonis and Finan (2006) find a positive peer effect of PROGRESA on school 
enrollment among children in PROGRESA communities who lived in ineligible households. 




Table 6. Percentage of PROGRESA households receiving transfers for school attendance but not 







San Luis  8.5 
Veracruz 9.8 
All states  9.7 
Figure 3. Proportion of households that did not receive forms to enforce PROGRESA conditions, by 
municipio 
 
To examine household-level unobservables that might affect the results, we first consider whether 
households that failed to receive an E1 form were systematically poorer than households that did receive 
an E1 form, using the logarithm of per capita consumption as measured during the previous survey round 
in October 1998 (Figure 4). We find little difference in the kernel density of the consumption distribution 
for households that did and did not receive an E1 form. We might also consider that smaller households 
might not have received forms, so we next show the distribution of the logarithm of household size, again 
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Figure 4. Kernel density of logarithm of per capita consumption, by whether or not the household 
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While these distributions do not provide obvious evidence of observable differences between 
household in Groups 1 and 2, if we estimate probits where the dependent variable equals one if the 
household is in Group 1 (receives the E1 form) and zero if the household is in Group 2 (does not receive 
the E1 form), some significant differences emerge.
18 Observables that are found to significantly affect 
Group 1 membership include whether the household head and spouse were agricultural laborers (both 
have negative effects), whether the household experienced an earthquake in the previous growing season 
(negative), whether the household received the PROGRESA manual (negative); and the number of platica 
meetings the household members missed (positive). It is worth noting specifically that shocks, such as 
earthquakes, have a negative and significant association with receipt of the E1 form, suggesting that some 
households simply could not attend the platicas where the E1 forms were distributed. 
Matching Results 
Because these results suggest that nonreceipt of the E1 form may not have been completely random, we 
extend our analysis by using nearest neighbor matching. Matching methods provide reliable, low-bias 
estimates of program impact, provided that (1) the same data source is used for participants and 
                                                      
18 We estimate these probits with exactly the same controls as found in column 6 of Table 4, except for the dependent 
variable. We also find significant differences if we estimate probits that attempt to explain Group 3 membership, using Group 4 
as the control. In this regression, whether or not the head of household’s spouse is literate, the logarithm of per capita 
consumption, whether or not the household includes a PROGRESA promotora, and the number of missed platicas all have 
significant influences on the probability of Group 3 membership. 
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nonparticipants, (2) participants and nonparticipants have access to the same markets, and (3) the data 
include meaningful X variables capable of identifying program participation and outcomes (Heckman, 
Ichimura, and Todd 1997, 1998; Heckman et al. 1998). The evaluation surveys clearly meet criterion (1). 
Criterion (2) is met by restricting the set of households/children that could not be monitored to be 
potentially selected as comparison observations to those households/children that were monitored and 
who lived in the same localities where PROGRESA was providing benefits and who were also already 
enrolled in PROGRESA. The evaluation surveys fielded in May-June 1999 as well as those fielded prior 
to that date provide a very rich set of variables that we use to identify receipt of the E1 forms, as required 
by criterion (3). 
The estimator can be derived following Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) and Smith and 
Todd (2001, 2005). Let 
1
t Y  be a child’s enrollment status in time period t if her household receives the E1 
form and 
0
t Y  be that child’s enrollment status in time period t if the household does not receive the form. 
The impact of receipt of the form (the imposition of conditionality) is simply the change in the outcome: 
0 1
t t Y Y − = Δ . However, for each child, only 
1
t Y  or 
0
t Y  is observed in any period, t. Let D be an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the household receives the E1 form and 0 otherwise. In the evaluation literature, D is 
an indicator of receipt of the “treatment.” We would like to construct an estimate of the average impact of 
imposing conditionality (via the receipt of the E1 form) on those that receive it, that is, the average impact 
of the treatment on the treated (ATT): 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 , | 1 , | 1 , | 1 , |
0 1 0 1 = − = = = − = = Δ = D X Y E D X Y E D X Y Y E D X E ATT t t t t , (1) 
where X is a vector of observable control variables. Because  ( ) 1 , |
0 = D X Y E t  is not observed, we 
estimate the impact using nearest neighbor matching with replacement to estimate the counterfactual 
outcome for participants (Abadie and Imbens 2006). The validity of any matching approach rests in part 
on two important assumptions. First, we assume “conditional mean independence,” implying that 
conditional on the observables (X), nonrecipients have the same mean outcomes as recipients would have 
if they did not receive the E1 form. Second, we assume that for all X, the probability of receiving the 
treatment cannot be exactly zero or one. If these assumptions are not violated, nearest neighbor matching 
with a bias correction is root-N consistent for estimates of the ATT (Abadie and Imbens 2007). 
We follow the following procedure to come up with our matching estimates. First, we estimate 
the propensity score for receipt of the E1 form (or receipt of the E1 form and a lack of knowledge of 
conditions) using a probit model. The controls include all of the variables in column 6 of Table 4.
19 We 
initially ensure that the propensity scores balance; that is, we test whether or not the treatment and 
comparison observations have the same distribution (mean) of propensity scores and of control variables 
within the quantiles of the propensity score. All results presented below are based on specifications that 
pass balancing tests. The distributions of propensity scores overlap each other for almost all of the ranges 
for Groups 1 and 2 (Figure 6) and Groups 3 and 4 (Figure 7). 
                                                      
19 The one difference is that we use child age as a continuous variable rather than as a set of dummy variables, to ensure that 




Figure 6. Kernel density of propensity scores, by receipt of an E1 form 
 
Figure 7. Kernel density of propensity scores, by whether or not households received the E1 form 
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We then match treatment and control observations using nearest neighbor matching with bias 
adjustment (Abadie and Imbens 2007).
20 The estimator matches each observation to its four nearest 
neighbors with replacement, and standard errors account for heteroscedasticity.
21 We provide estimates 
based both on the full sample for which common support exists (Table 7, column 1) and on a trimmed 
sample, which minimizes the variance of the estimator by trimming observations with theoretically 
imprecise estimates of the propensity score. To determine the optimal amount of trimming, we compute 
the variance for trims at 0.01 intervals from 0 to 0.1, using the formula found in Crump et al. (2006). This 
calculation reveals that we should drop observations with a propensity score below 0.04 for comparison 
of Groups 1 and 2 and below 0.03 for comparison of Groups 3 and 4.
22 
Table 7. Matching estimates of the impact of receiving E1 forms on school enrollment for the full 
sample and by grade obtained 
 
Treatment: Group 1 
(households that did not receive the 
E1 form) 
Treatment: Group 3 
(households did not receive the 
E1 form and did not know 
conditions) 
  Full sample  Trimmed sample   Full sample  Trimmed sample
Sample used  (1)  (2)    (3) (4) 
Full sample of children completing  -0.072  -0.072    -0.092  -0.096 
 (0.018)**  (0.019)**    (0.028)**  (0.029)** 
By grade           
Completed Grade 3  -0.007  -0.007    -0.010  -0.010 
 (0.013)  (0.013)    (0.023)  (0.023) 
Completed Grade 4  -0.025  -0.024    -0.037  -0.039 
 (0.026)  (0.027)    (0.045)  (0.048) 
Completed Grade 5  0.011  0.011    0.007  0.006 
 (0.020)  (0.020)    (0.034)  (0.034) 
Completed Grade 6  -0.158  -0.160    -0.185  -0.189 
 (0.048)**  (0.048)**    (0.064)**  (0.066)** 
Completed Grade 7-8  -0.027  -0.053    -0.131  -0.143 
 (0.043)  (0.045)    (0.079)*  (0.076)* 
Notes: Matching by nearest neighbor with bias correction (see Abadie and Imbens 2006, 2007). Standard errors in parentheses 
are corrected for heteroscedasticity. In columns (2) and (4), the sample was trimmed to minimize the variance of estimation, 
using the procedure described in Crump et al. (2006). We trim any observations with a propensity score below 0.04 in column (2) 
and below 0.03 in column (4). * significant at the 5 percent level; ** significant at the 1 percent level. 
The matching estimates are remarkably similar to those found with the simple differences and the 
estimated coefficients from the probits (Table 7). On average, the matching results suggest that children 
in households that did not receive the E1 form are 7.2 percentage points less likely to enroll in school 
(Table 7, column 2), and nonreceipt of the E1 form coupled with the lack of knowledge of PROGRESA 
conditions reduces the enrollment likelihood by 9.6 percentage points (Table 7, column 4). As with the 
results discussed above, we find a great deal of heterogeneity when we estimate separate coefficients for 
children by grade completed.
23 When we do so, we find that the effect is again largest when children 
                                                      
20 We use nearest neighbor matching as opposed to other matching methods because it is root-N consistent when we adjust 
for the potential bias in convergence, it works particularly well when the number of treatment observations is small relative to the 
control, and because it avoids making parametric assumptions about relationships between the X variables in the model. 
Nonetheless, when we use propensity score estimation with local linear regression or kernel matching, as preferred by some 
authors (Frölich 2004; Smith and Todd 2005), our results are nearly identical. 
21 The results are robust to using one-to-one matching or additional nearest neighbor matches. 
22 Theoretically, we would have also dropped any observations with propensity scores above 0.96 for the comparison of 
Groups 1 and 2 and above 0.97 for Groups 3 and 4, but none of the estimated propensity scores exceed 0.5 in these data. 
23 Because very few children who had completed grade 8 were included in Group 3, we estimate matching results for 




transition from primary to lower secondary school, and there is some suggestion that nonreceipt of the E1 
form together with absence of knowledge of conditions has an even larger effect on attendance than 
nonreceipt alone.
24 Furthermore, the estimated coefficients are remarkably consistent with the 
unconditional means and the results from the probits. As with the probit results, we find no evidence that 
conditionality affects continuing primary school enrollment. In results not reported here, we assessed 
whether these results differed by gender, but did not find large differences between males and females in 
the magnitudes of these effects. 
Three Further Robustness Checks 
Our principal finding is that, on average, receipt of the E1 form increases the likelihood that children are 
enrolled in school. The average effect masks significant heterogeneity across children in different grade 
levels; there appears to be little effect of E1 form receipt among children continuing primary school, 
while the effect of receiving the E1 form is quite large for children making the transition from primary to 
lower secondary school. The results are remarkably consistent whether we consider simple descriptive 
statistics, probit regressions, or nearest neighbor matching. As such, these results are robust even after we 
condition on a wide range of observable characteristics. However, as is well known, these approaches do 
not condition out unobservable characteristics. Households that did not receive the E1 form may differ 
from other households in subtle ways. For example, household members may not understand how the 
program is supposed to work, or they may be recalcitrant individuals who simply do not like having to 
follow rules or procedures, such as going to meetings to pick up forms, or sending their children to school 
because the government tells them to do so. To further ensure that our results are not driven by 
household- or individual-level unobservables, we perform three additional robustness checks. 
First, we assess whether selection on unobservables could explain our results by computing an 
informal test statistic suggested by Altonji, Elber, and Taber (2005), who demonstrate how to estimate the 
ratio of selection on unobservables to observables that would be necessary to explain an entire coefficient 
estimate of interest. We calculate this statistic for both the average effect on enrollment using the 
variables in column 6 of Table 4, and for children who have completed grade 6 in Table 5. To fully 
explain the coefficients found in Table 4, selection on unobservables into Group 1 would have to be 9 to 
13 times larger than selection on observables, and 6 to 7 times larger to fully explain the result for 
children completing grade 6.
25 Even if household unobservables have a positive bias on our estimates, the 
effect of selection on unobservables cannot be large enough to account for the entire estimated 
coefficients. 
Second, we exploit the fact that some households have more than one child in grades 3 to 8. 
While our treatment is unobserved at the household level, the results from Tables 5 and 7 tell us that the 
impact of the treatment varies by the grade attainment of the child. Therefore, we can interact the last 
completed grade with either Group 1 or 3 membership and use the linear probability model to regress 
enrollment on completed grade level, the interactions described above, and household-level fixed effects 
(Table 8).
26 Whether or not we control for age dummies and the child’s gender, the coefficients we 
estimate on the interaction between either Group 1 or 3 membership and completion of grade 6 are 
negative, statistically significant, and strikingly consistent with the coefficients estimated with either 
                                                                                                                                                                           
score. 
24 We also explore whether, conditional on enrollment, receipt of the E1 form increases attendance. In general, we find a 
positive effect, but it is not statistically significant. 
25 In a linear probability model version of the regression in column 6 of Table 4, the R
2 is 0.2, meaning that selection on 
observables accounts for 20 percent of the variation in enrollment. This finding indicates that even if selection on unobservables 
accounts for the remaining 80 percent of the variation in enrollment, the coefficient for Group 1 membership would still be 
negative. For grade 6 completion, the R
2 is 0.29, again indicating that selection on unobservables could not completely eliminate 
the negative coefficient. 
26 Note that the inclusion of household fixed effects here accounts for any household-level unobservables that we cannot 
account for in the probit or matching models. For example, one might argue that if the survey respondent frequently consumes a 




probits or nearest neighbor matching.
27 As these regressions account for household-level unobservables 
with the household-level fixed effects, they provide strong evidence that unobservables do not drive our 
results. 
Third, we consider an indirect approach. As part of the PROGRESA program, beneficiaries had to 
attend platicas where information and training on health, good diets, and nutrition was given by a doctor 
and/or nurse from the health clinic serving the community. While Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004) show 
that attendance at platicas was causally associated with the acquisition of calories from fruits, vegetables, 
and animal products, even after controlling for PROGRESA’s income effect, eating a better diet was 
encouraged but not monitored. This suggests the following robustness check: does receipt of the E1 form 
affect food acquisition? Our null hypothesis is that conditioning educational transfers should not change 
caloric acquisition. Since the conditions attached to schooling have nothing to do with patterns of food 
consumption, rejecting this null would suggest that receipt/nonreceipt of the E1 form is actually capturing 
some sort of unobservable characteristic such as those described above. 
Table 8. Impact of receipt of E1 forms, by grade completed, OLS with household fixed effects 
 
Treatment: 
households that did not receive 
forms 
Treatment: 
households that did not 
receive forms and did not 
know conditions 
Specification (1)  (2)    (3) (4) 
Completed Grade 4  -0.016  0.013    0.003  0.031 
 (0.86)  (0.67)    (0.12)  (1.33) 
Completed Grade 5  -0.026  0.054    -0.017  0.063 
 (1.90)*  (2.09)**    (0.93)  (2.04)** 
Completed Grade 6  -0.303  -0.056    -0.267  -0.025 
 (14.74)**  (1.68)*    (9.59)**  (0.70) 
Completed Grade 7  -0.126  0.182    -0.116  0.208 
 (6.42)**  (4.87)**    (3.78)**  (4.09)** 
Completed Grade 8  -0.161  0.295    -0.139  0.338 
 (7.51)**  (6.93)**    (4.71)**  (7.19)** 
Completed Grade 4*treatment  -0.034  -0.018    -0.099  -0.055 
 (0.56)  (0.35)    (1.18)  (0.69) 
Completed Grade 5*treatment  0.059  0.025    0.007  -0.028 
 (1.33)  (0.59)    (0.09)  (0.40) 
Completed Grade 6*treatment  -0.178  -0.183    -0.231  -0.211 
 (2.85)**  (3.18)**    (2.81)**  (2.75)** 
Completed Grade 7*treatment  -0.03  -0.035    -0.274  -0.146 
 (0.55)  (0.57)    (2.04)**  (1.10) 
Completed Grade 8*treatment  0.043  0.002    -0.066  -0.071 
 (0.84)  (0.03)    (0.88)  (0.82) 
Age, Gender Dummies?  No  Yes    No  Yes 
Number of observations  5,656  5,656    3,131  3,131 
Notes: Regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares with household-level fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 
the locality level. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.  
 
 
                                                      
27 Although the fixed effects regression accounts for household-level unobservables, the results could potentially be 
explained if initial lower secondary school enrollment is more sensitive to other variables that might be correlated with the lack 
of forms. To test whether lower secondary school enrollment is simply more sensitive, we interact several variables (for example, 
income and literacy of the household head) with the levels of grade completion and reestimate the household fixed effects model. 
The estimated coefficients are typically insignificant; where we find significant coefficients (for example, substituting the literacy 
of the head for Group 1 enrollment), we also include Group1 enrollment interacted with grade completion, and find no qualitative 




The May 1999 survey contained a set of questions of the following form: “In the last seven days, 
how much have you consumed of the following foods.” This question was asked with reference to 35 
different foods. To convert these data into calories, disparate units of measurement were converted into a 
common measure for each food item. Volumes were converted to weights using the Tablas de Valor 
Nutrivo for Mexico (Muñoz de Chávez et al. 1996). The acquisition of each food item, expressed in 
kilograms, was multiplied by the percentage weight of the food deemed edible, and these edible 
kilograms of food were converted to kilocalories, again based on information found in the Tablas de 
Valor Nutrivo. These 35 food variables and their aggregate, calories per family per week were then 
converted to daily amounts and divided by household size to yield caloric availability per person per day. 
Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004) describe this procedure in more detail. 
Using both the same matching technique as above and an Ordinary Least Squares regression, we 
consider the impact of receipt of the E1 form on total calorie consumption per capita as well as calories 
from the following food groups: grains, fruits and vegetables, animal products, and other foods (Table 9). 
The estimation results demonstrate that receipt of the E1 form does not affect the acquisition of calories, 
and, in particular, does not affect the acquisition of calories from sources such as fruits, vegetables, and 
animal products, which Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004) show are affected by exposure to the platicas. As 
such, it is unlikely that recalcitrant individuals unlikely to follow directions were more likely to not 
receive the E1 form. From our perspective, this exercise provides further indirect evidence that our 
findings are related to conditionality and not unobserved household characteristics. 
Table 9. Estimates of the impact of receiving E1 forms on household caloric access, by type of food 
  Treatment: households that did not receive forms 
Sample used  Matching  OLS 
Total calorie consumption  48.6  76.1 
 (32.6)  (50.8) 
Calories from grains  42.2  65.8 
 (31.0)  (49.9) 
Calories from fruit and vegetables  0.53  0.20 
 (1.51)  (1.92) 
Calories from animal products  -2.80  1.57 
 (5.47)  (6.18) 
Calories from other foods  8.72  8.52 
 (6.09)  (7.26) 
Notes: Standard errors are robust using nearest neighbor matching and are clustered at the municipio level in the OLS regression. 
* significant at the 5 percent level; ** significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
Heterogeneity by Parental Characteristics 
We have shown that the effect of receiving the E1 form is heterogeneous by grade level completed; in this 
subsection, we explore whether or not coefficient estimates are heterogeneous by parental characteristics. 
We explore heterogeneity using three dimensions: whether or not the household head is literate, whether 
or not the head is an agricultural laborer; and whether or not the head is indigenous. If the household head 
is not literate, PROGRESA might not be as well understood by the household, and as a result one might 
think that the lack of form E1 might have stronger effect on enrollment. Indigenous households might 
have a similar problem understanding the program. If the head is not an agricultural laborer, he or she 
might have additional information about off-farm jobs, and therefore households that include children 





We add an interaction between the three indicator variables and Group 1 and 3 membership, 
sequentially, in probit regressions (Table 10). We use both the whole sample (Table 10, columns 1, 3, and 
5), and the sample of children who had completed grade 6 (Table 10, columns 2, 4, and 6).
28 We find 
some evidence that literacy matters, and the estimated coefficients suggest that literacy matters a great 
deal, particularly for children who have completed grade 6. The marginal effect is only significant for the 
comparison of Groups 1 and 2 (Table 10, Panel A), but it implies that among children living in 
households that did not receive the E1 form, a child with a literate household head is 27 percentage points 
more likely to enroll in school than a child with an illiterate head. Children in households with illiterate 
heads are 46 percentage points less likely to enroll in lower secondary school. Clearly, conditionality is 
particularly important for such households. We also find some evidence that when the head has off-farm 
work, conditionality is more important. When households did not receive the E1 form or understand the 
conditions, children completing grade 6 were more than 40 percentage points less likely to enroll in lower 
secondary school, while children whose parents were agricultural laborers were only 16 percentage points 
less likely to enroll (Table 10, Panel B, rows 1 and 3). 
Table 10. Probit estimates of the impact of receiving E1 forms on school enrollment, by literacy of 
head, agricultural labor, and indigenous status 
Panel A: Groups 1 and 2 (Group 1 did not receive E1 forms) 
  Grades 3-8
Completed 
Grade 6  Grades 3-8
Completed 
Grade 6  Grades 3-8 
Completed 
Grade 6 
Sample (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Member of Group 1 (1 = yes)  -0.093  -0.461  -0.076  -0.334  -0.032  -0.212 
 (3.35)**  (3.81)**  (3.65)**  (4.40)**  (2.00)*  (2.91)** 
Group 1*Head is literate  0.068  0.270         
 (1.50)  (2.17)*       
Group 1*Head is agricultural 
laborer     0.044  0.131     
     (1.29)  (1.58)     
Group 1*Head is indigenous          -0.037  -0.003 
         (0.81)  (0.01) 
Head is literate (1 = yes)  0.012  -0.019  0.017  0.016  0.017  0.017 
 (1.15)  (0.46)  (1.86)  (0.38)  (1.89)  (0.41) 
Head is agricultural laborer 
(1 = yes)  <0.001  0.01  -0.004  -0.01  <0.001  0.008 
 (0.01)  (0.29)  (0.44)  (0.27)  (0.00)  (0.26) 
Head is indigenous (1 = yes)  0.028  0.131  0.028  0.132  0.032  0.135 
  (2.86)**  (3.19)**  (2.89)**  (3.21)**  (3.09)**  (3.03)** 
Observations  5,503  1,308  5,503  1,308  5,503  1,308 
 
                                                      
28 Estimating the marginal effects using probit regressions is not trivial, due to the nonlinearity of the estimator. We use the 




Table 10. Continued 
 
Panel B: Groups 3 and 4 (Group 3 did not receive E1 forms and did not know conditions) 
  Grades 3-8
Completed 
Grade 6  Grades 3-8
Completed 
Grade 6  Grades 3-8 
Completed 
Grade 6 
Sample (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Member of Group 3 (1 = yes)  -0.142  -0.386  -0.143  -0.408  -0.052  -0.174 
 (4.16)**  (2.56)*  (4.39)**  (3.47)**  (2.40)*  (2.13)* 
Group 3*Head is literate  0.095  0.202         
 (1.64)  (1.37)       
Group 3*Head is agricultural 
laborer     0.107  0.248     
     (1.82)  (2.06)*     
Group 3*Head is indigenous          -0.043  0.015 
         (0.67)  (0.22) 
Head is literate (1 = yes)  0.007  -0.028  0.012  -0.006  0.013  -0.004 
 (0.56)  (0.51)  (1.14)  (0.13)  (1.20)  (0.09) 
Head is agricultural laborer 
(1 = yes)  0.006  0.016  0  -0.015  0.006  0.015 
 (0.55)  (0.33)  (0.00)  (0.28)  (0.58)  (0.31) 
Head is indigenous (1 = yes)  0.024  0.125  0.024  0.128  0.028  0.128 
  (1.87)  (2.58)**  (1.92)  (2.65)**  (2.13)*  (2.48)* 
Observations  3,071  715  3,071  715  3,071  715 
Notes: All coefficients presented are marginal effects; interaction terms are computed using the procedure outlined in Norton, 
Wang, and Ai (2004). t-statistics based on standard errors accounting for clustering at the locality are given in parentheses. * 








4.  CONCLUSION 
A growing body of evidence suggests that conditional cash transfer programs can have powerful positive 
effects on a wide range of welfare indicators. However, there is much less evidence on the specific 
contributions that individual components of these programs make toward achieving these outcomes. The 
contribution of this paper is to assess the impact of conditionality on one dimension of human capital 
formation, school enrollment, using data from Mexico’s PROGRESA CCT program. We exploit the fact 
that some PROGRESA beneficiaries did not receive the form needed to monitor their children’s school 
attendance. Using a variety of techniques, we show that the absence of this form reduced the likelihood 
that children attended school, on average, and the likelihood of school attendance was severely reduced 
when children were making the transition to lower secondary school. We use a variety of techniques to 
ensure that our findings are not driven by unobservable household characteristics. 
These results speak directly to policy debates regarding the merits of conditionality within CCT 
programs. They suggest that debates over “to condition or not to condition” are overly simplistic. In the 
case considered here, there is clearly little benefit to conditioning transfers based on enrollment in 
primary school. However, in terms of increased school enrollment, there are large benefits associated with 
conditioning transfers at entry into lower secondary school. As such, these findings are consistent with the 
more general argument advanced in de Janvry and Sadoulet (2006), namely that there can be considerable 
efficiency gains to CCTs by calibrating their design more carefully. That said, additional study of this 
topic would be worthwhile. Two issues would seem to be particularly valuable to explore. First, an 
experimental design—where conditionality was randomly assigned—would bolster the evidence base 
while removing any lingering doubts about the role of unobservables. Second, an experimental design in 
which the intensity by which information on conditions was varied across beneficiaries would allow 





APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
Table A.1. Probit estimates of the impact of nonreceipt of the E1 form on school enrollment of 
children who had completed grades 3-8, comparing Group 1 (did not receive the E1 form) with 
Group 2 (received the E1 form) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Group 1 (1=yes)  -0.054  -0.046  -0.045  -0.046  -0.049  -0.044 
  (3.37)** (3.68)** (3.53)** (3.62)**  (3.79)** (3.56)**
Child characteristics         
Gender (1=male)    0.011  0.011  0.011  0.01  0.01 
   (1.63)  (1.67)  (1.62)  (1.48)  (1.54) 
Child is 9 years old    0.053  0.052  0.049  0.049  0.048 
   (1.32)  (1.33)  (1.21)  (1.18)  (1.22) 
Child is 10 years old    0.049  0.049  0.044  0.043  0.044 
   (1.20)  (1.21)  (1.05)  (1.02)  (1.05) 
Child is 11 years old    0.003  0.004  -0.003  -0.002  0.003 
   (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.06) 
Child is 12 years old    -0.034  -0.033  -0.041  -0.041  -0.035 
   (0.58)  (0.56)  (0.66)  (0.67)  (0.58) 
Child is 13 years old    -0.129  -0.127  -0.134  -0.136  -0.123 
   (1.70)  (1.66)  (1.70)  (1.71)  (1.56) 
Child is 14 years old    -0.244  -0.239  -0.251  -0.253  -0.244 
   (2.75)** (2.69)** (2.73)**  (2.73)** (2.60)**
Child is 15 years old    -0.384  -0.381  -0.393  -0.397  -0.382 
   (3.65)** (3.57)** (3.59)** (3.60)** (3.37)**
Child is 16 years old    -0.558 -0.559 -0.571 -0.57  -0.556 
   (4.48)** (4.39)** (4.40)** (4.36)** (4.14)**
Parental characteristics         
Logarithm, age of household head      0.023 0.023 0.02  0.017 
     (1.27) (1.28) (1.04) (0.96) 
Head is female (1=yes)      0.027 0.019 0.018 0.017 
    (2.32)*  (1.51)  (1.46)  (1.43) 
Head is literate 
    0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019 
    (2.00)* (1.99)* (2.02)* (2.04)* 
Head is agricultural laborer     <0.001  0.001  <0.001  0.001 
     (0.06) (0.10) (0.03) (0.09) 
Head is indigenous 
   0.032  0.03  0.029  0.029 
   (3.15)** (3.05)**  (2.91)** (2.95)**
Spouse of head is indigenous      0.008 0.009 0.008 0.005 
     (0.64) (0.69) (0.60) (0.37) 
Spouse of head is literate      0.023 0.023 0.022 0.021 
    (3.23)** (3.25)**  (2.96)** (2.94)**
Household characteristics, measured in October 1998        
Logarithm, per capita consumption       -0.005  -0.006  -0.005 
      (0.69)  (0.84)  (0.73) 
Logarithm, household size       -0.047  -0.048  -0.044 





Table A.1. Continued 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Additional household characteristics, including shocks            
Household experienced drought         -0.002  -0.001 
        (0.21)  (0.14) 
Household experienced flood         -0.028  -0.028 
        (0.72)  (0.75) 
Household experienced freezing crops         -0.012  -0.004 
        (0.68)  (0.22) 
Household experienced fire         0.002  0.003 
        (0.05)  (0.08) 
Household experienced crop epidemics         0.011  0.015 
        (0.79)  (1.14) 
Household experienced earthquake tremors         0.015  0.008 
        (0.86)  (0.50) 
Received PROGRESA book         <0.001  0.001 
        (0.03)  (0.05) 
Received Health Register         -0.006  <0.001 
        (0.23)  (0.01) 
Was a PROGRESA promoter         0.012  0.014 
        (0.78)  (0.92) 
Platicas held         0.001  <0.001 
        (0.43)  (0.05) 
Platicas missed         0.001  0.002 
         (0.40)  (0.49) 
Community characteristics            
Community has electricity          0.023 
          (2.21)* 
Community has primary school           -0.012 
          (0.82) 
Community has lower secondary school          0.042 
          (4.92)** 
Community has secondary school           -0.045 
          (1.60) 
State  dummies?  yes yes yes yes  yes  yes 
          
Number of observations  5,637 5,637 5,608 5,608  5,503  5,503 
Notes: Group 1 refers to households that did not receive the E1 form. The results of these regressions are the full results 
corresponding to Table 4, Panel A; standard errors are clustered at the locality. * indicates significance at the 5 percent level; 




Table A.2. Probit estimates of the impact of nonreceipt of the E1 form on school enrollment of 
children who had completed grades 3-8, comparing Group 3 (did not receive the E1 form and did 
not know conditions) with Group 4 (received the E1 form and knew conditions) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Group 3 (1=yes)  -0.09  -0.067  -0.064  -0.066  -0.075  -0.07 
  (4.23)** (3.97)** (3.90)** (3.95)**  (4.08)**  (3.95)**
Child characteristics             
Gender (1=male)   0.006  0.006  0.006  0.005  0.006 
   (0.69)  (0.69)  (0.67)  (0.57)  (0.67) 
Child is 9 years old   0.053  0.054  0.053  0.052  0.051 
   (1.31)  (1.40)  (1.40)  (1.39)  (1.37) 
Child is 10 years old   0.064  0.065  0.064  0.062  0.059 
   (1.69)  (1.76)  (1.72)  (1.69)  (1.61) 
Child is 11 years old   0.032  0.034  0.034  0.034  0.034 
   (0.67)  (0.74)  (0.73)  (0.75)  (0.74) 
Child is 12 years old   0.002  0.006  0.006  0.003  0.003 
   (0.03)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.06) 
Child is 13 years old   -0.054  -0.046  -0.044  -0.048  -0.045 
   (0.77)  (0.67)  (0.64)  (0.70)  (0.66) 
Child is 14 years old   -0.17  -0.157  -0.155  -0.159  -0.158 
   (2.00)*  (1.88)  (1.84)  (1.89)  (1.84) 
Child is 15 years old   -0.287  -0.27  -0.267  -0.277  -0.271 
   (2.76)** (2.60)** (2.56)*  (2.66)**  (2.54)* 
Child is 16 years old   -0.431  -0.416  -0.415  -0.422  -0.416 
   (3.35)** (3.23)** (3.19)**  (3.25)**  (3.13)**
Parental characteristics           
Logarithm, age of household head      0.027  0.027  0.026  0.026 
     (1.33)  (1.32)  (1.21)  (1.32) 
Head is female (1=yes)      0.025  0.022  0.015  0.015 
     (1.53)  (1.29)  (0.90)  (0.94) 
Head is literate      0.012  0.012  0.014  0.015 
     (1.01)  (1.02)  (1.22)  (1.39) 
Head is agricultural laborer      0.007  0.007  0.007  0.008 
     (0.62)  (0.62)  (0.57)  (0.72) 
Head is indigenous      0.03  0.029  0.025  0.027 
     (2.23)*  (2.26)*  (1.97)*  (2.20)* 
Spouse of head is indigenous      0.016  0.016  0.015  0.011 
     (0.97)  (0.99)  (0.91)  (0.64) 
Spouse of head is literate      0.025  0.025  0.021  0.02 
     (2.46)*  (2.56)*  (2.12)*  (2.06)* 
Household characteristics, measured in October 
1998           
Logarithm, per capita consumption        -0.014  -0.016  -0.017 
       (1.51)  (1.98)*  (2.13)* 
Logarithm, household size        -0.029  -0.033  -0.034 





Table A.2. Continued 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Additional household characteristics, including shocks          
Household experienced drought          -0.008  -0.005 
         (0.97)  (0.64) 
Household experienced flood          -0.014  -0.018 
         (0.43)  (0.58) 
Household experienced freezing crops          -0.018  -0.008 
         (1.11)  (0.56) 
Household experienced fire          0.033  0.033 
         (0.85)  (0.93) 
Household experienced crop epidemics          0.003  0.008 
         (0.21)  (0.58) 
Household experienced earthquake tremors          0.03  0.022 
         (1.80)  (1.36) 
Received PROGRESA book        -0.019  -0.018 
        (1.61)  (1.51) 
Received Health Register        0.024  0.023 
        (0.55)  (0.50) 
Was a PROGRESA promoter        0.011  0.012 
        (0.66)  (0.72) 
Platicas held        -0.003  -0.004 
        (0.69)  (0.99) 
Platicas missed        0.005  0.006 
        (0.82)  (0.98) 
Community characteristics         
Community has electricity         0.022 
         (1.85) 
Community has primary school         -0.016 
         (0.78) 
Community has lower secondary school         0.033 
         (2.98)**
Community has secondary school         -0.048 
         (3.04)**
State  dummies?  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
        
Number of observations  3,131  3,131  3,121  3,121  3,71  3,071 
Notes: Group 3 refers to households that did not receive the E1 form and did not know conditions. The results of these 
regressions are the full results corresponding to Table 4, Panel B; standard errors are clustered at the locality. * indicates 
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